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Plaintiffs Maria Schneider and Pirate Monitor LTD, as and for their Complaint against 
Defendants YouTube, LLC (“YouTube”), Google LLC (“Google”), and Alphabet Inc. (“Alphabet”) 
(collectively, “Defendants”), allege upon personal knowledge as to acts and events taking place in 
their presence or upon information and belief for all other acts as follows: 
INTRODUCTION 
1. This case is about copyright piracy. YouTube, the largest video-sharing website in 
the world, is replete with videos infringing on the rights of copyright holders. YouTube has 
facilitated and induced this hotbed of copyright infringement through its development and 
implementation of a copyright enforcement system that protects only the most powerful copyright 
owners such as major studios and record labels. Plaintiffs and the Class are the ordinary creators of 
copyrighted works. They are denied any meaningful opportunity to prevent YouTube’s public display 
of works that infringe their copyrights—no matter how many times their works have previously 
been pirated on the platform. They are thus left behind by YouTube’s copyright enforcement system 
and instead are provided no meaningful ability to police the extensive infringement of their 
copyrighted work. These limitations are deliberate and designed to maximize YouTube’s (and its 
parents Google’s and Alphabet’s) focused but reckless drive for user volume and advertising 
revenue. Moreover, the Plaintiffs and the Class are not only prevented from using any meaningful 
enforcement tool, but the system in place actually exacerbates the harms caused to them including 
in a manner that bars Defendants from the protections of any safe harbors under applicable 
copyright laws such as the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (“DMCA”).  
2. The copyright management tool that YouTube provides to the behemoths of the 
creative industry is Content ID—a digital fingerprint tool that compares videos being uploaded on 
YouTube to a catalogue of copyrighted material submitted by those entities permitted to utilize 
Content ID. Content ID is not only unavailable to Plaintiffs and the Class, but it actually insulates 
the vast majority of known and repeated copyright infringers from YouTube’s repeat infringer 
policy, thereby encouraging its users’ continuing upload of infringing content.  
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3. Defendants Alphabet, Google, and YouTube reap billions of dollars annually from 
the online hosting of videos, including millions of works that infringe on the exclusive copyrights 
of Plaintiffs and the Class. Defendants permit and facilitate this infringement because it furthers 
their growth and revenue strategies and because they have determined that Plaintiffs and the Class—
unlike YouTube’s preferred Content ID partners—lack the resources and leverage necessary to 
combat copyright infringement on the scale at which it is perpetuated on YouTube.  
4. YouTube has more than 2 billion users worldwide every month, which according to 
Defendants is “almost one-third of the internet.” Users watch more than one billion hours of videos 
every single day, equating to approximately 5 billion videos viewed each day. YouTube estimates 
that more than 720,000 hours of videos—more than 82 years’ worth—are uploaded every day, 
equating to more than 500 hours of content uploaded every minute.  
5. However, to become the preferred platform for both uploaders and viewers, 
Defendants knowingly permitted YouTube also to become a hotbed of piracy. From its start, 
YouTube recognized that its success was highly dependent on the rapid growth in online postings 
(or “uploads”) of “user-generated content,” to be uploaded quickly and with no prepublication 
diligence, making the unauthorized upload of copyrighted material unavoidable. Google purchased 
YouTube with full knowledge of YouTube’s rampant copyright piracy, yet Google chose to foster 
YouTube’s growth rather than protect copyright holders; it even refused to implement anti-piracy 
tools it had previously developed on another video sharing platform designed to curb such 
infringement.  
6. Given the two-sided market YouTube functions in—where it wants to drive both 
viewers and content providers--Defendants’ motives are obvious. The ready availability of pirated 
content is the source of “network effects.” A vast library of pirated content draws users to the site, 
and the growth in users incentivizes the posting of more content on YouTube, which in turn enables 
Defendants to reap more advertising revenue. Building extensively on the backs of copyright holders 
who never gave authorization for their works to be displayed on YouTube, Defendants report that 
they now derive $15 billion in revenue from advertising on YouTube, as well as unspecified billions 































   
CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT – JURY TRIAL DEMANDED 
 
from subscriptions, other YouTube services, and the exploitation and monetization of personal data 
harvested from all of its users.  
7. In addition to the billions of dollars of direct advertising revenue, the Google search 
and advertising platform independently gains massive value capitalizing on the rapid upload of 
materials, much of which infringes on class members’ copyrights. Every time a viewer engages with 
the YouTube platform, Google harvests valuable information on individual user preferences and 
aggregate user demographics. This data is used to develop targeted advertising for YouTube, for 
Google, and further across the internet via Google’s AdSense, AdX, and AdManager products and 
services, each of which generate additional billions of dollars for Defendants. Google is estimated 
to control 40% of the online advertising market, with much of it built on data it gathers from 
YouTube viewers drawn to the website by infringing material. 
8. Faced with litigation by major music studios and other significant rights holders, 
Defendants have crafted distinct and disparate systems of copyright “enforcement” on their 
platform. For those entities with vast stores of copyright material and thus the leverage to require 
Defendants to appease their copyright management concerns, YouTube created its Content ID 
program, which allows qualifying copyright owners automatically to identify and manage their 
content on YouTube. Videos uploaded to YouTube are scanned against a database of files that have 
been submitted to Defendants by those qualifying copyright owners. Such owners get to decide 
what happens when content in a video on YouTube matches a work they own; the available options 
are (on a country-specific basis) to block the whole infringing video from being viewed, monetize 
the infringing video by running ads against it (in some cases sharing revenue with the uploader), or 
track the infringing video’s viewership statistics.   
9. Smaller rights holders, including Plaintiffs and the Class, are, however, denied 
access to Content ID and thus are relegated to vastly inferior and time-consuming manual means 
of trying to police and manage their copyrights such as scanning the entirety of YouTube postings, 
searching for keywords, titles, and other potential identifiers. Plaintiffs and the Class must then file 
individual takedown notices with YouTube via a web-form, email, or postal mail for each video 
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their searches identify. Defendants have, in effect, created a two-tiered system whereby the rights 
of large creators with the resources to take Defendants to court on their own are protected, while 
smaller and independent creators like Plaintiffs and the Class are deliberately left out in the cold. 
10. The inequities of these disparate systems are pervasive. The following table 
contrasts the protections offered by Content ID with those accorded ordinary copyright enforcers. 
Content ID Ordinary Rights Enforcers 
Screening is performed at the moment of 
upload, before a video is published on 
YouTube preventing public availability 
through YouTube of the infringing 
material. 
Screening is performed only after a video is 
uploaded, published on YouTube and the 
infringing material is available to the general 
public. 
Screening is performed automatically 
using the digital fingerprint system 
provided by YouTube that automatically 
compares the actual content of each 
uploaded video with the entire catalog of 
Content ID-protected works. 
Screening (if any) must be performed through 
keyword searches in an attempt to identify 
infringing works via titles, authors, and 
keywords attached to the video by the 
uploader.  
Content ID automatically imposes the 
rights holder’s enforcement option to 
block the infringing video from 
publication on the platform, to monetize 
the infringing video through advertising 
revenue, or monitor download statistics 
of the infringing video. 
Once the rights holder identifies infringing 
videos, the rights holder must file a takedown 
notice with YouTube for each offending 
video, specifying the URL location of the 
offending work, and providing evidence of 
the holder’s right to enforce the copyright. 
After a delay of days or weeks during which 
the infringing material remains publicly 
available and the harm caused by the 
infringement continues, YouTube may 
suspend or remove the video. 
 
11. The superior protections of the Content ID system are completely denied to 
Plaintiffs and the Class no matter how many times their copyright protected works are infringed 
on the YouTube platform. If a rights holder does not have the economic clout to qualify for 
Content ID, YouTube refuses to add their works to the Content ID catalog for prepublication 
protection even if those works have previously been infringed on YouTube hundreds or even 
thousands of times. Through its use of these systems, YouTube exerts significant control over 
which infringing videos may be published on its site and which infringing videos are never viewed 
by the public.   
12. Moreover, Defendants have completely divorced their Content ID system from 
their legally mandated repeat-infringer policy. The DMCA provides a safe harbor against copyright 
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infringement claims for entities such as YouTube so long as they formulate and reasonably 
enforce a policy of terminating repeat copyright infringers from their platform. YouTube purports 
to take advantage of this safe harbor by having a policy that assesses a “copyright strike” against 
the uploader when an ordinary rights holder files a takedown notice and terminating uploaders 
when they accrue three active copyright strikes within 90 days. However, when infringing content 
is uploaded and identified by the Content ID system, no copyright strikes are issued.1 Thus, when 
Google brags that 98% of its “copyright issues are resolved via Content ID,”2 what it really means 
is that nearly all identified copyright infringing material is entirely insulated from its repeat-
infringer policy. This two-tiered system essentially trains YouTube’s billions of uploading users 
that there is essentially minimal risk to uploading to their hearts’ content. And while YouTube’s 
Content ID partners are protected from these repeat infringers because their uploads will always 
be screened against the Content ID catalog before publication, Plaintiffs and the Class remain at 
risk of recurring infringement by these same repeat infringers.  
13. While Defendants state that Content ID eligibility is based on a variety of criteria, 
only five percent or less of all people who apply for Content ID are approved. Plaintiffs have 
applied and have either been rejected or received no response. In the meantime, Plaintiffs 
continue to suffer copyright piracy. Plaintiffs have had their exclusive copyrights infringed 
multiple times, despite having sent prior successful takedown notices for those very same works 
and despite Defendants’ having actual and constructive knowledge that YouTube is being used 
continuously to infringe Plaintiffs’ copyrights. 
14. Defendants have forfeited their claim to the DMCA safe harbor protections in 
other ways as well. For example, rights holders who seek to actively enforce their copyrights by 
filing numerous takedown notices run the risk of losing access to YouTube’s rudimentary tools 
purportedly designed to facilitate the takedown notification process. Moreover, Defendants 
                                                 
1  YouTube’s own Help page expressly states, “Content ID claims don’t result in a strike.” 
https://support.google.com/youtube/answer/2814000?hl=en, last visited July 1, 2020. 
2  “How Google Fights Piracy,” p. 30, 
https://www.blog.google/documents/27/How_Google_Fights_Piracy_2018.pdf, last visited July 1, 2020. 
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arbitrarily limit the number of takedown notices they will process from rights holders such as 
Plaintiffs and the Class. YouTube also constrains the use of certain automated tools meant to help 
locate infringing content on the platform. Defendants are liable for the copyright piracy on their 
platform because their current approach to copyright infringement, including the operation of the 
Content ID system, fails to satisfy the requirements mandated in order to be protected under the 
DMCA safe harbor. 
15. The overall effect of Defendants’ inducement of copyright infringement, 
manipulation of search, willful blindness, data harvesting, and selective enforcement of copyright 
screening tools is to depress the value of creators’ work and destroy the free marketplace for those 
works, where willing buyers and willing sellers can transact business. Instead, Defendants have 
created an alternative and unlawful marketplace, where the advertising revenue and valuable data it 
derives from publishing those works—free of charge to the consumer—bears no rational 
relationship to the creator’s real cost of producing those works; this significantly injures the 
creators, but enormously benefits Defendants. The ready availability on YouTube of unauthorized 
copyrighted materials and the whack-a-mole approach required for creators to remove infringing 
material works disincentivize the creation of new works and reduce the value of all works.  
 PLAINTIFFS 
16. Plaintiff Maria Schneider, a citizen of the state of New York, is a multiple Grammy 
award-winning composer and musician. Plaintiff Schneider holds exclusive copyrights to 
numerous works, including the songs “Hang Gliding,” “Green Piece,” and “Journey Home.”  
17.  Plaintiff Pirate Monitor LTD is a limited company with its principal place of 
business at Intershore Chambers, 3rd Floor, Geneva Place, Road Town, Tortola, VG1110 British 
Virgin Islands. Pirate Monitor owns the exclusive rights to reproduce, publicly perform, publicly 
display, and distribute the following works, among others, over the internet: Csak szex és más semi; 
Zimmer Feri 2; and Immigrants – Jóska menni Amerika. 
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 DEFENDANTS 
18. Defendant YouTube, LLC, is a Delaware limited liability company with its 
principal place of business at 901 Cherry Avenue, San Bruno, California 94066. In 2006, YouTube 
was purchased by Google and since that purchase YouTube has operated as a wholly owned and 
controlled subsidiary of Google. At all times relevant to this Complaint, the website YouTube.com 
was operated and controlled by either or both of YouTube, LLC and Google LLC.  From time to 
time, YouTube conducts business as Google. For example, YouTube’s support documentation, 
including an explanation of how the Content ID program works, is hosted on 
“support.google.com.” 
19. Defendant Google LLC is a Delaware limited liability company with its principal 
place of business at 1600 Amphitheatre Parkway, Mountain View, California 94043. Since 2006, 
Google has wholly owned and controlled YouTube. Google is a wholly owned and controlled 
subsidiary of Defendant Alphabet. Google is the alter ego of YouTube and Alphabet. For 
example, YouTube and Google share user data from their respective websites, youtube.com and 
google.com, in order to create new content and personalized advertisements on both sites. 
Google’s search engine is the largest preceding source of all visits to YouTube, more than 6 times 
that of any other website. YouTube and Google also combine both products for purposes of 
Google’s AdWords advertising program, which allows an advertiser to determine that if a person 
searches for a specific term on Google’s search engine (e.g., financial advisor), the advertiser can 
direct that the next time that user watches a video on YouTube that person will see an 
advertisement for financial advisory services. Google has also recently begun testing integrating 
links to its search engine within YouTube’s search results.   
20. Defendant Alphabet Inc. is a Delaware corporation with its principal place of 
business at 1600 Amphitheatre Parkway, Mountain View, California 94043. Alphabet wholly owns 
and controls Google. Alphabet is the alter ego of Google. Alphabet is the alter ego of YouTube 
and Google. YouTube and Google direct all profit to, and report revenue through, Alphabet.  
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 JURISDICTION 
21. This is a civil action seeking damages and injunctive relief for copyright 
infringement under the Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 101 et seq. 
22. This Court has original subject matter jurisdiction over all claims pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1338(a). 
23. This Court also has subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d) because 
the proposed Class contains more than 100 persons, the aggregate amount in controversy exceeds 
$5,000,000 and at least one proposed Class Member is a citizen or subject of a foreign state and 
Defendants are citizens of the State of California. 
24. This Court has personal jurisdiction over Defendants. YouTube, d/b/a Google 
LLC, Google, and Alphabet each maintain their headquarters in California and in this District. All 
Defendants have transacted business within California and contracted to supply goods or services 
in California in connection with the matters giving rise to this suit. Defendants have also 
committed copyright infringement causing injury to Plaintiffs and members of the Class in 
California. Defendants regularly solicit and do business in California and derive substantial 
revenue from goods used or services rendered. Defendants’ address for takedown notices of 
infringing content on YouTube is in California and in this District. 
25. Venue is proper in this District pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1391(b), (c) and 1400(a). 
26. YouTube’s terms of service provide that all claims relating to the terms of service 
or arising out of the terms of service shall be litigated in federal or state courts in Santa Clara 
County, California, USA, and that YouTube consents to personal jurisdiction therein.  
 NATURE OF THE ACTION 
I. The Importance of Copyright and Copyright Enforcement 
27. Copyrights are the means by which creators of original content protect their moral 
and economic rights in that content. Respecting the financial value of creators’ works is such a 
cornerstone of our democracy that it was enshrined in the U.S. Constitution, which expressly gave 
Congress the power to “promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited 
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Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.” 
U.S. Const. Article I, Section 8. “Copyright law encourages people to create original works and 
thereby ‘ultimately serves the purpose of enriching the general public through access to creative 
works.’” Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517, 526 (1994). The Supreme Court of the United States 
has recognized that by “establishing a marketable right to the use of one’s expression, copyright 
supplies the economic incentive to create and disseminate ideas.” Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. 
Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985) (emphasis added).  
28. The importance of copyright enforcement is not limited to the United States. As 
far back as the early 1500s, courts in France recognized that only the creators of works, or their 
assigned heirs, should have the right to publish those works. As early as 1886, more than 10 
countries signed or ratified the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic 
Works, which has a stated purpose to promote the “protection of the rights of authors in their 
literary and artistic works.” The Convention ensures that authors are afforded the same 
protections in those signatory countries as they would enjoy within their own country, thereby 
promoting the worldwide distribution of creative works while at the same time ensuring that the 
rights of the author of a work created in one country will not be circumvented through the 
infringement of those rights in another country. As of today, 188 countries, including the United 
States, have signed the Berne Convention.  
29. The 1976 Copyright Act makes it illegal for people to publicly perform, publicly 
display, distribute, or reproduce a copyrighted work except in limited instances, and provides for 
statutory damages, willful statutory damages, and the right to recover attorneys’ fees. 17 U.S.C. §§ 
501 et seq. 
30. YouTube is by far the world’s largest “user-generated-content” publishing 
platform, where billions of users upload and publish not only true user-generated-content, but also 
works that infringe the copyrights owned by others, including on occasion by Plaintiffs and the 
Class. Without adequate protection for copyright holders’ rights, YouTube poses an existential 
threat to copyright laws. See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 928 
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(2005) (noting “digital distribution of copyrighted material threatens copyright holders as never 
before, because every copy is identical to the original [and] copying is easy”). For that reason, it is 
critical that YouTube not encourage or promote copyright infringement, act in a willfully blind 
manner to ignore identifiable copyright infringement on its site, alter or remove metadata that is 
protected “copyright management information,” or deploy its copyright protection tools in an 
inadequate and selective manner.  
31. Each of the copyright-infringing acts alleged herein has diminished the moral, 
legal, and economic rights of Plaintiffs and Class members. The infringements have unjustly 
benefitted Defendants and have eroded the incentive to create new content in the same way by 
taking away a true marketplace, by misappropriating the revenues that should have been earned by 
Plaintiffs and the Class through their works, by diminishing the value of their ownership rights in 
such works, and/or by requiring individual rights holders to spend endless time pursuing “whack-
a-mole” DMCA takedowns rather than devoting their time and energy to creating new 
copyrightable works.    
II. YouTube Was Designed to Enable and Facilitate Copyright Infringement 
 
A. YouTube Uses Various Methods to Drive Uploads of Videos for Display on  
Its Platform and to Drive Views of Such Videos From Its Platform. 
 
32. YouTube, now the world’s most popular online video site, launched in 2005. Users 
can access the platform in two distinct, yet complimentary roles: as “uploaders”—who publish 
videos to their unique YouTube pages, known as “channels,” and as “viewers”—who watch, 
review, and comment on the videos published by others.  
33. When a user uploads a video or song or other piece of work, YouTube has its 
users copy the original video file into a file type specified by YouTube; it then adds one or more 
copies of the newly formatted file to its servers, and may remove, replace metadata, or add new 
metadata to the file, all in order to make the file available for public viewing on its platform. Upon 
upload, the altered video file becomes part of the YouTube library for publication and display 
through YouTube’s website, which Defendants control and directly and indirectly profit from. 
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34. YouTube actively encourages viewers to find and play videos on its website in 
numerous ways. When a viewer enters a search request into YouTube’s search bar, Defendants 
return a list of matching videos in its library accompanied by thumbnails and other metadata about 
the video, such as a title chosen by the uploader and the number of YouTube views. A YouTube 
viewer can then select that video to play by clicking on one of the thumbnails or the 
accompanying information in the list of videos supplied by Defendants in response to the user’s 
search request. When the user does so, Defendants then display the chosen video by streaming 
audio and video data from YouTube’s servers to the user’s computer or phone so that the user can 
view the selected video. As a video streams, YouTube causes the user’s computer or phone to 
download audiovisual data of the selected video. 
35. YouTube also enables any viewer to “embed” further publishing of any video in 
the publicly available YouTube library into another website such as Facebook, a blog, or any other 
website where a user can post video content. The embedding feature is available by default for 
every video on YouTube, and the embedded video will appear as a picture with the YouTube logo 
prominently displayed. When someone clicks on the embedded video, it will stream the audio and 
video from YouTube’s servers in the context of the host website; in this way, the YouTube 
platform is still displaying the video by transmitting the streaming video content from YouTube’s 
own servers to the viewer’s computer. Defendants also enable YouTube viewers to “share” videos 
with others—for example, through email. If a viewer wants to share a video by email, the feature 
will generate an email with a link to the specific video. Any recipient of that email can click on the 
link to be brought to the YouTube website in order to view the video. 
36. YouTube’s “embed” and “share” features have contributed significantly to 
YouTube’s growth in popularity, number of users, amount of content uploaded, and the data it 
captures and exploits from its uploaders and viewers. Because YouTube provides its users with the 
ability to view and listen to copyrighted materials free of charge, when the user would otherwise 
have to pay for such access, billions of users are naturally drawn to YouTube. Defendants’ “free” 
business model, built on piracy and an abuse of the DMCA safe harbors, has made YouTube the 
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primary outlet for music and video streaming and display. YouTube and Google, in combination, 
are the predominant means by which the public searches and discovers music, film, and other 
artistic works. As a result, artists like Plaintiffs and the Class must accede to the overwhelming 
market power of YouTube, because if you are not on YouTube, you don’t exist.  
37. Defendants also drive viewers to view multiple videos on YouTube by generating 
recommendations based on a closely guarded algorithm and metadata system that recommends 
additional videos to view next to the selected video as it is being played, and by their “AutoPlay” 
feature that queues subsequent videos to play sequentially. Since 2016, YouTube’s 
recommendation algorithms have utilized Google Brain to refine and maximize their effectiveness 
in increasing “user engagement” and viewing time.  Defendants recently proclaimed that YouTube 
has been successful in controlling over 70% of the works viewed by the user through its 
recommended video algorithm and Autoplay feature.3 As YouTube’s technical lead for YouTube 
recommendations has put it, “[YouTube] also wanted to serve the needs of people when they 
didn’t necessarily know what they wanted to look for.”4  
38. As a result of YouTube’s recommended video algorithm, search engine algorithm, 
and Autoplay feature, Defendants exert substantial control over the behavior of YouTube users 
and content posters. Exercising this control over users has paid off significantly. From the early 
introduction of its recommendations in 2014 to its refinements as of 2017, the aggregate time 
users spend watching videos on YouTube increased twentyfold. 
39. As a result, every time an unauthorized copyrighted work is viewed without 
authorization, it is more likely than not that Defendants’ conduct directed the viewer to the 
infringing work. Within the time period relevant to this litigation, Defendants automatically caused 
copyright infringement through the viewing of copyright-protected material without any 
affirmative action required by a user.   
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B. Maximizing the Amount of Online Content—Including Infringing Content—
Was, and Remains Key to the Growth in Viewers of the YouTube Platform. 
 
40. Like other online platforms that don’t “sell” their services, YouTube was originally 
designed to bring together its users: content generators who upload videos and content consumers 
who watch those videos. This basic business model for a platform leverages one of the most 
powerful forces in the online economy—“network effects”—to scale quickly and maintain 
momentum. Network effects occur where a service increases in value with the total number of 
users.5 YouTube benefits from direct “network effects” in that, as more videos are uploaded, the 
entire platform becomes more attractive to the watchers of those videos. That attractiveness to 
those viewing the videos in turn makes the platform more attractive to uploaders who desire to 
have their uploaded materials viewed by the ever-increasing number of viewers. Defendants 
benefit economically as a result of network effects because, among other things, as the number of 
videos increase and the number of video watchers increases, the YouTube platform becomes 
more attractive to advertisers who, as described below, seek to target and reach watchers by 
posting advertising associated with videos that are likely to attract the advertisers’ targeted 
audiences. As also described below, Defendants further gain from these effects by monetizing the 
valuable data about users that YouTube is able to gather from the viewing choices of its users.  
41.  Defendants’ formula for economic success is simple: more videos, leads to more 
viewers, leads to more advertising and more data for YouTube to sell. That is, a large number of 
viewers attracts uploaders who upload more videos; more videos, in turn, attracts more viewers; 
viewers provide personal information and YouTube collects data on viewers’ watching habits.  
More viewers also attracts advertisers, who purchase advertisements to display before, during, and 
after uploading videos; and YouTube makes money by selling advertisements in addition to selling 
the data they gather on viewers, uploaders, and advertisers alike. YouTube requires its users to 
consent to YouTube collection of individualized data for numerous purposes, including the 
                                                 
5  Alec Stapp, “You Can’t Understand Big Tech Without Understanding Network Effects. Here’s a Road Map.” 
Niskanen Center, Sept. 13, 2018. 
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development of new products and personalized advertisements and content. YouTube has 
substantial incentives to maximize the amount and variety of content that is streamed on its 
platform to maximize the advertising views and to maximize the amount of data it can harvest. 
Ignoring copyrights for all but those most able to force YouTube to protect their copyrights—i.e., 
those who are given access to Content ID—helps Defendants to drive this economic engine to 
higher levels by using copyright piracy as a key element of YouTube’s growth strategy.  
42. This model is ingrained in the very foundation of YouTube. Indeed, one of 
YouTube’s founders urged it to build up its numbers “as aggressively as we can through whatever 
tactics, however evil.” That same founder argued against the company removing obviously 
infringing videos, claiming that site traffic would drop by 80% if it did so. In February 2006, a 
YouTube employee estimated that over 70% of the most viewed, most discussed, top-favorited, 
and top-rated videos contained copyrighted material. That employee later estimated that 75 to 
80% of YouTube’s views came from copyrighted material posted without authorization. 
Nevertheless, YouTube continued to enable and facilitate copyright infringement so that it could 
attract as many users as quickly as possible.  
43. The desire to facilitate and enable copyright infringement did not end with 
Google’s $1.65 billion purchase of YouTube in 2006. At that time, Google operated a competing 
website, Google Video, that, unlike YouTube, engaged in a process of reviewing and screening 
each uploaded video to avoid infringing content before the upload was publicly performed, 
displayed, reproduced, or distributed.  
44. Notably, prior to Google’s acquisition of YouTube, Google characterized 
YouTube as “a rogue enabler of content theft” that was “completely sustained by pirated content” 
and viewed YouTube’s success as due to “its liberal copyright policy.” Google even found it 
difficult to compete with YouTube at that time and considered “whether we should relax 
enforcement of our copyright policies in an effort to stimulate traffic growth” on Google Video.  
45. Instead of competing, however, Google purchased YouTube in October 2006 for 
$1.65 billion. As part of that transaction, Google’s financial advisor Credit Suisse warned Google 
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that over 60% of YouTube’s views were of “premium” copyrighted content and that only 10% of 
that content was licensed. Nonetheless, Google did not apply to YouTube the pre-upload 
screening process that it used on Google Video; instead, Google chose to continue YouTube’s 
aggressive policy of allowing obviously infringing videos to be uploaded with zero “friction” and 
no screening, thus allowing infringing and illegally posted videos to be played and monetized by 
YouTube unless and until a takedown notice was received from the copyright owner.     
46. With over 500 hours of videos uploaded every minute, this “frictionless” policy 
without screening for the copyrights of Plaintiffs and the Class guarantees that uploaders can 
infringe their copyrights at a pace that is far greater than the rate at which copyright holders can 
try to enforce their rights or the rate at which YouTube could ever process takedown requests. 
One Google employee tasked with responsibility for selecting videos to be prominently displayed 
on the website noted that they were “running into issues finding enough videos because they have 
so many copyright violations.” In a negotiation with one copyright holder, the Motion Picture 
Association of America, Google recognized that “the copyrighted content on YouTube was a 
major lure for their users.”  
 
C. With the Growth of the Platform, Google and YouTube Can Maximize  
Advertising Revenue Through a Combination of Available Content for 
Advertisement Placement, and Superior Advertisement Targeting Through 
Data Generation. 
47. As discussed above, YouTube maximizes revenues by having continually more and 
more content available online. Sustained and ongoing growth of uploaded content provides more 
online space for advertising to be sold and attracts more viewers who will see such advertising. 
Additional viewers, in turn, attract both more advertising and more uploads—and the network 
effects cycle continues.  
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48. Defendants have been remarkably successful in this online real estate grab. By one 
estimate, YouTube holds 70% of the market for online video content in the United States, as 
measured by the number of domains.6 
49. Currently, Defendants earn advertising revenue directly from YouTube’s library of 
videos. First, Defendants earn 100% of the advertising revenue generated through the placement 
of advertisements on its homepage and search-results pages. The value of these ads is directly 
related to the number of users Defendants are able to attract and the overall size of its library. The 
number of users that Defendants can attract is, in turn, increased by the ready availability of 
unauthorized copyrighted works that can be viewed for free.  
50. In addition, if a YouTube uploader chooses to turn on account monetization, 
through Defendants’ YouTube Partner Program or otherwise, Defendants will automatically place 
an advertisement within and around the video that is being publicly displayed, with Defendants 
keeping at least 45% of what Defendants calculate (without transparency) to be their “net income” 
advertising revenue. The uploading user retains no more than 55% of that “net” figure. The 
annual “net income” Defendants generated from YouTube in 2019 was recently revealed to 
include $15 billion in advertising revenue alone, and that does not include the significant value of 
the user data, which Defendants exploit in manifold ways, or the significant corporate expenses 
Defendants recover before calculating this “net” figure. 
51. Defendants also benefit from YouTube’s contributions to the growth and financial 
success of other Google products and services as well. YouTube is now estimated to draw 2 
billion regular viewers each month. As users interact with the YouTube platform, including 
through the posting and viewing of copyright-infringing material, they convey valuable 
information concerning their preferences for topics, products, and services. Defendants can use 
the individual and aggregate data they glean from these viewers to improve their entire product 
empire, ranging from advertisement exchanges, like AdSense and AdX, to Google’s third-party 
                                                 
6  https://www.datanyze.com/market-share/online-video/United%20States.  
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advertisement server, Double Click for Publishers. Indeed, YouTube’s privacy policy as embedded 
in its Terms of Service links to a Google privacy policy that discusses both Google and YouTube 
as one, and that states that the user’s data will be shared and utilized to develop new services, fine-
tune search results, and create personalized advertisement. Google is now estimated to control 
40% of the entire online advertising market, and the data it reaps from YouTube users, including 
those drawn to the site to view copyright-infringing works, plays a significant role in its growth. 
III. Defendants’ Delayed and Tiered Copyright Enforcement Mechanisms Were and 
Are Designed to Maximize Their Revenues and Create “Friction” for Those 
Seeking to Enforce Their Copyrights. 
52. Defendants’ delayed implementation of readily available screening technologies, 
and their decision to use such technologies in a way that maximizes their revenue from copyright 
infringement further demonstrates their intent to facilitate and profit from known copyright 
infringement. Defendants are obligated to comply with the safe harbor provisions of the DMCA 
in order to earn protection from liability for copyright infringement. Defendants’ business model, 
however, instead embraces such infringement because each infringing work represents additional 
advertising opportunities and attracts additional viewers to YouTube. Simply put, more stringent 
enforcement of copyrights would be harmful to Defendants’ revenue derived from YouTube—if 
all infringing material were subject to a pre-upload screening feature like Content ID or to being 
taken down, YouTube would lose valuable online real estate and viewers.  
53. Because YouTube receives a percentage of all advertising revenues, it is indifferent 
to whether it shares those revenues with the copyright enforcer or the infringing party. However, 
complete diversion of revenues away from infringing parties and towards copyright enforcers 
would also undermine YouTube’s business model (and thus its revenue maximization). If its net 
income from unauthorized uploads were also to include a fair share for the content creators, many 
smaller YouTube channels would lose their economic incentive to continue uploading infringing 
material to the platform. Indeed, Defendants’ opposition to the EU’s recent copyright protection 
measures, which will likely require Defendants to pre-screen all videos for copyright infringement 
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prior to upload and/or offer Content ID to everyone who has submitted a prior takedown notice, 
reflects these very fears.  
54. Instead, in order to amplify its profits, YouTube offers different levels of relief to 
copyright enforcers that is tied to their level of engagement and activity on YouTube. These non-
negotiable business terms enable Defendants to maximize the amount of infringing content that 
remains online by permitting the enforcers with the most resources to protect their rights to 
monetize the infringing material, while relegating copyright enforcers of more limited means to the 
issuance and prosecution of individual takedown notices.  
55. Since YouTube’s inception, there has been readily available and relatively 
inexpensive content-filtering software to proactively identify and prevent the public display of 
infringing videos. Critically, however, only a site operator like YouTube can prevent copyright 
infringement at the time the video is uploaded and before it becomes public. Despite readily 
available standard tools, YouTube intentionally limits the availability of such content-filtering, and 
refuses to allow Plaintiffs and the Class such access and use.  
56. Defendants’ Content ID program is the most effective tool for any copyright 
holders who wish to block unauthorized uploads at the time of upload. Content ID allows the 
copyright enforcer to submit its copyrighted works (e.g., copyrighted videos or copyrighted songs 
that might be used in an infringing video) to YouTube, which uses those copyrighted videos to 
create a digital fingerprint. All videos uploaded to YouTube are then scanned against the database 
of these digital fingerprints. If Content ID finds material that matches one of the submitted works, 
the copyright holder can choose to: (1) block a whole video from being viewed; (2) monetize the 
video by running ads against it, in some cases sharing revenue with the uploader; or (3) simply 
track the video’s viewership statistics.   
57. Without any explanation as to why, Defendants state that Content ID is intended 
for “those who own exclusive rights to a large amount of original content (like a record label or 
movie studio), are submitting a high number of complete and valid takedown requests, and are 
able to dedicate the resources needed to manage it.” This program is highly automated, with 
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YouTube automatically conducting the search and match process upon any upload of a video and 
allowing the copyright enforcer to pre-select an enforcement mechanism. 
58. But, to the detriment of Plaintiffs and the Class, Defendants refuse to allow this 
tool to be made available to them, nor is any reasonable substitute provided, thus allowing 
Defendants to continue to benefit from the prolific infringement of Plaintiffs’ and the Class’s 
copyrighted materials. Only approximately five percent or less of all applicants who attempt to 
sign up for Content ID are approved for its use.  
59.  As a bipartisan group of U.S. Senators and Congressional Representatives wrote 
to Google on September 3, 2019, there are significant “concerns that copyright holders with 
smaller catalogs of works cannot utilize Content ID, making it more difficult or almost impossible 
for them to effectively protect their copyrighted works from infringement and, ultimately, 
impacting their livelihoods.” Indeed, these legislators noted that they had “heard from copyright 
holders who have been denied access to Content ID tools, and as a result, are at a significant 
disadvantage to prevent repeated uploading of content that they have previously identified as 
infringing. They are left with the choice of spending hours each week seeking out and sending 
notices about the same copyrighted works, or allowing their intellectual property to be 
misappropriated.”  
IV. Defendants’ Treatment of Plaintiffs Reflects Their Intent to Permit  
Misappropriation of Plaintiffs’ Rights Despite Actual and Constructive Knowledge. 
60. Plaintiff Schneider holds exclusive copyrights to numerous works, including, e.g., 
the songs “Hang Gliding,” “Green Piece,” and “Journey Home.” “Hang Gliding” was first 
published in 2000 and was registered with the United States Copyright Office on May 20, 2003. 
“Green Piece” was created in 1987 and was registered with the United States Copyright Office on 
May 18, 1992. “Journey Home” was first published in 2000 and was registered with the United 
States Copyright Office on May 20, 2003. 
61. The aforementioned songs have, at various times, been posted in full or in part on 
YouTube and have been viewed by YouTube users. 
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62. Plaintiff Schneider has twice applied for Content ID and has been rejected both 
times. 
63. Plaintiff Schneider has sent multiple takedown requests to YouTube to remove 
infringing videos from 2013 to the present, including videos containing each of the 
aforementioned songs. 
64. After submitting the takedown requests, and on numerous occasions, each of the 
aforementioned songs has been subsequently posted in full or in part on YouTube without 
Plaintiff Schneider’s authorization. For instance, as of the date of this Complaint, at least twelve 
separate YouTube videos of “Hang Gliding” are published by YouTube, with tens of thousands of 
cumulative plays performed by various groups, and none of which are uploads authorized by 
Plaintiff Schneider. By being forced to continuously self-police uploads across YouTube’s billions 
of uploads, as opposed to automatic and preemptive blocking, Plaintiff Schneider is forced to 
weigh the further financial damage caused to her by alienating performance groups, including 
those who purchased her music scores. 
65. As of January 24, 2020, Pirate Monitor owns the exclusive rights to reproduce, 
publicly perform, publicly display, and distribute the following works, among others, over the 
internet: Csak szex és más semi; Zimmer Feri 2; and Immigrants – Jóska menni Amerika. 
66. The aforementioned works are non-U.S. works exempt from the registration 
requirements of the Copyright Act. The works were first published in Hungary.  
67. The aforementioned works have, at various times, been posted in full or in part on 
YouTube and have been viewed by YouTube users. 
68. On February 18, 2020, Immigrants – Jóska menni Amerika was registered with the 
United States Copyright Office.  
69. In connection with the transfer of ownership described above, Pirate Monitor was 
expressly assigned, and/or became the owner of, all previously accrued claims for copyright 
infringement as to its exclusive right to reproduce, publicly perform, publicly display, and 
distribute the works over the internet.  
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70. For each of these works, full videos of these feature length films have been 
uploaded to YouTube without authorization from Pirate Monitor, including, for Immigrants – Jóska 
menni Amerika, after it obtained registration with the U.S. Copyright Office.  
71. Pirate Monitor has applied for access to Defendants’ Content ID program and 
Defendants have either refused its application or taken an unreasonably and arbitrarily long time 
to respond, with Defendants continuing to derive financial benefit from the infringing material in 
the meantime.  
72. For each of these aforementioned unauthorized videos, Pirate Monitor sent 
copyright takedown notices to YouTube. Even when the notices did result in removal of the 
infringing material, the infringing videos remained publicly available for several days after Pirate 
Monitor sent its takedown notices.  
73. Immigrants has been reposted in full following Pirate Monitor’s first takedown 
notice. 
74. Pirate Monitor has been prevented from sending takedown notices for each of 
these works because Defendants limit the number of notices that Plaintiff and the Class can send 
in a day. 
75.    Both before and after completing their respective Content ID application forms, 
users uploaded and viewed Plaintiffs’ works—feature films and music recordings—in full and 
without Plaintiffs’ authorization. In all instances, Plaintiffs’ takedown notices were deemed 
sufficiently valid by Defendants for the video to be removed, but each time the video remained 
available online for an additional 4-6 days before removal. 
76. Each time Defendants removed the infringing video, the same person or another 
person has subsequently re-uploaded Plaintiffs’ copyrighted feature-length films or music 
recordings in full. Despite Defendants being aware of prior infringement concerning these very 
same works, and despite Defendants having the software available to filter subsequent uploads of 
works that were subject to prior successful takedown notices, they repeatedly allowed further 
infringing videos (often the exact same videos) to be publicly performed, displayed, reproduced, or 
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distributed until Plaintiffs were able to search and locate the new infringing content, send another 
takedown notice, and await YouTube’s response—a further delay allowing for still more copy-cat 
infringing works to be posted which would then have to be found and new takedown notices 
submitted.  
77. Put simply, copyright holders should not be forced to repeatedly demand that the 
same platform take down infringing uses of the same copyrighted work, while other rights holders 
are provided access to standard digital fingerprinting and blocking tools. By not allowing Plaintiffs 
to block the upload of infringing materials at the time of upload, Defendants force Plaintiffs and 
the Class into a time consuming, cumbersome, inaccurate, and flawed “manual” process to 
enforce their copyrights, all to the benefit of Defendants’ money-making machine.  The inequities 
of this two-tiered system ensure that, at best, unauthorized YouTube uploads will always outpace 
the ability of Plaintiffs and the Class to take those videos down. 
78. Indeed, Plaintiffs’ repeated, oftentimes successful takedown notices ensure that 
Defendants’ have actual or constructive knowledge that uploaded videos infringing Plaintiffs’ 
copyrights are routinely publicly performed, publicly displayed, distributed, and/or reproduced on 
YouTube. Despite this knowledge, Defendants: a) prevent Plaintiffs and those similarly situated 
from joining Content ID; b) do not create a digital fingerprint of materials that have triggered 
successful takedown notices to prevent additional infringement; c) prevent Plaintiffs and the Class 
from sending more than a limited number of takedown notices; and d) prevent Plaintiffs and the 
Class from using automated tools to help identify infringing works that have been uploaded to 
Defendants’ platform. Again, Defendants thereby intend and ensure that copyright infringement 
will outpace the ability to police such infringement, all to the benefit of their bottom line. 
V. Defendants’ Mistreatment of Copyright Management Information Has Enabled, 
Induced, Concealed, and Contributed to Infringement of Plaintiffs’ Works. 
79. Section 1202 of the DMCA defines “copyright management information” (“CMI”) 
to include information conveyed in connection with digital copies of a work, including the title, 































   
CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT – JURY TRIAL DEMANDED 
 
author, copyright owner of the work, performers on the work, lyricist, producer, and other similar 
information providing attribution for, and reflecting the moral rights of, creators.  
80. The recognition and preservation of CMI is vital to the lawful distribution of 
digital works. The digital versions of files containing musical or video works that are lawfully sold 
and distributed in the United States routinely contain associated metadata that includes CMI. For 
example, International Standard Musical Word Codes (“ISWC”), which are a globally recognized 
standard for the recognition of musical works, can provide the basis for royalty payments to the 
copyright owners when those works are distributed by streaming platforms, such as Spotify. MP3 
files, a common format for the digital distribution of audio works, routinely include a metadata 
container, namely an ID3 file, which ordinarily holds CMI. So too, the MP4 file format, which is 
commonly used for some digital videos, includes copyright information as a standard metadata 
field. However, despite the prevalence of CMI metadata associated with the original protected 
audio and video works, Defendants and their business model and systems routinely ignore that 
CMI. When Plaintiffs have found infringing copies of their works on YouTube, the original CMI 
associated with the digital file is missing, either stripped or concealed. 
81. YouTube neither encourages nor protects the original CMI metadata during the 
upload process, even though YouTube knows it exists and its value for protecting the rights of 
creators. As just one example, where an MP3 may include the internationally recognized 
International Standard Recording Code (“ISRC”) for that recording in its ID3 file, YouTube does 
not require that its users who are uploading content to transfer the ISRC in the original file to the 
unauthorized converted video file. Moreover, Google declines to provide users with audio file 
conversion software that would automatically retain and encode the CMI associated with 
protected works. Instead, YouTube simply directs users to a general Wikipedia page listing video 
editing software, knowing that the terms of most video-editing conversion software do not allow 
the resulting “videos” to be used for Defendants’ commercial purposes. Indeed, a search for the 
phrase “copyright management information” on the YouTube Help page returns precisely zero 
results. 
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82. Thus, despite having clear knowledge of the pervasive presence of CMI associated 
with protected works, and the vital role played by CMI in the lawful distribution and economic 
protection of copyrighted musical and video works, Defendants have created a system that not 
only disregards, but eliminates or conceals, and/or encourages uploaders to eliminate or conceal, 
CMI from the video files published on the YouTube platform. Of course, if YouTube required its 
users to include valuable metadata (like the ISRC) with an upload, it would add considerable 
“friction,” and might also deter a user from uploading if the user were to realize the importance of 
this statutorily protected metadata. 
83. As a result of the removal and/or alteration of CMI, the purposes of section 1202 
have been frustrated. YouTube viewers cannot determine key attribution for many infringing 
works and cannot determine that Plaintiffs are the copyright owners of their works. The absence 
of CMI leads YouTube viewers to believe that Plaintiffs’ works can be copied, displayed, “shared,” 
embedded, and distributed at will. Defendants are aware that their display and distribution of 
Plaintiffs’ works with missing, incomplete, and/or inaccurate CMI, has induced, enabled, 
facilitated, and concealed the ongoing and additional infringement of Plaintiffs’ rights under the 
Copyright Act. Defendants have built an entire commercial publication business based on the 
value of their own metadata and algorithms but have denied Plaintiffs and the Class the value of 
the original metadata included in the copyrighted works, even though much of that original 
metadata is protected under § 1202. 
VI. Defendants Are Not Entitled to the Safe Harbor Protections of the Digital 
Millennium Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 512. 
84. The DMCA shields online platform service providers from damages and certain 
injunctive relief for copyright infringement arising from the storage, at the direction of a user, of 
infringing material on the service provider’s platform provided that the service provider complies 
with certain threshold requirements. Because YouTube fails to comply with these requirements, it 
is not entitled to protections of the DMCA safe harbor. 
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85. As a condition of qualification for the DMCA safe harbor, YouTube must 
designate an agent to receive takedown notifications in a form proscribed by § 512. Pursuant to 
this section, the takedown notice must identify the copyrighted work claimed to have been 
infringed, identify the infringing material, and provide “information sufficient to permit the service 
provider to locate the material.” 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3)(iii).  
86.    YouTube imposes arbitrary limitations on the number and frequency of 
takedown notifications it will process from rights holders. This limits the ability of Plaintiffs and 
the Class to enforce their copyrights and imposes additional burdens and delay on them. Where 
these limits are exceeded, rights holders risk losing access to YouTube’s copyright protection tools 
or having their Content Management System Account terminated, both of which assist the 
protection of copyrights. By imposing these arbitrary limitations on its notification and takedown 
procedures, YouTube has violated the requirements of the DMCA and forfeited its safe harbor 
protections.  
87. YouTube has also recently begun requiring some rights holders to identify the 
specific start and stop moments within the infringing work where the protected material is 
embedded. These new requirements also add considerable “friction” on the takedown process, 
thereby increasing Defendants’ profits. For example, while this is an automated process within 
Content ID, this new requirement places an additional burden on Plaintiffs and the Class. By 
conditioning these notification and takedown procedures on the provision of additional 
information—information not required under the DMCA—YouTube has violated the 
requirements of the DMCA and forfeited its safe harbor protections.  
88. In order to qualify for the DMCA safe harbor, YouTube must further establish 
that it has adopted and reasonably implemented a policy providing for the termination, in 
appropriate circumstances, of the accounts of repeat infringers. YouTube has implemented a 
repeat-infringer policy that provides for the termination of users who receive three copyright 
strikes. A copyright strike is assessed when YouTube receives a complete and valid takedown 
notice issued against the user’s channel. Copyright strikes expire after 90 days. Thus, any user can 
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safely upload eight copyright infringing works annually, so long as they are appropriately timed, 
without any risk of termination. This three-strike policy, as applied, allows for repeat infringement. 
YouTube has effectively abrogated its repeat-infringer policy and has failed to reasonably 
implement a policy providing for the termination, in appropriate circumstances, of the accounts of 
repeat infringers. By erasing copyright strikes after 90 days, YouTube has not satisfied the safe 
harbor requirements of the DMCA and forfeited its safe harbor protections. Further, even where 
YouTube has deleted a user’s account because of its three-strike policy, nothing prevents that user 
from creating a new account and YouTube takes no steps to check whether newly created 
accounts are on behalf of previously terminated users.  
89. Moreover, Defendants have completely divorced their Content ID system from 
their legally mandated repeat-infringer policy. When infringing content is uploaded and identified 
by the Content ID system, no copyright strikes are issued—the infringing content is either 
published and monetized by the rights holder, or blocked. Because the Content ID system is 
entirely separate from the copyright strike system, YouTube has effectively insulated the vast 
majority of all copyright infringements from consideration under its repeat-infringer policy. It also 
creates a general sense of animosity within its ecosystem against those who are forced to serve 
“take down” notices and thereby generate “strikes” against its users, which intimidates Plaintiff 
Schneider and similar artists from attempting to enforce their constitutionally protected rights.  
Even though those permitted to use Content ID block billions of uploads, they “get to play the 
good guy,” as blocking is done behind the scenes; but because Plaintiffs and the Class need to 
manually block in a very visible and punitive way, they are forced to “play the bad guy.” 
90. The only repercussions a repeat infringer faces when he uploads Content ID-
protected materials are the blocking of his upload, or the rights holder’s diversion and retention of 
the advertising revenues associated with the work. Moreover, while YouTube’s Content ID 
partners are protected from these repeat infringers because their uploads will always be screened 
against the Content ID catalog before publication, Plaintiffs and the Class remain at risk of 
infringement by YouTube uploaders with numerous Content ID claims—the quintessential repeat 
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infringers. By segregating nearly all copyright-infringing material from consideration under its 
repeat-infringer policy while leaving Plaintiffs and the Class subject to violations from those same 
repeat infringers, YouTube has failed to satisfy the safe harbor requirements of the DMCA and 
forfeited its safe harbor protections. 
91. As an additional requirement of the DMCA safe harbor protection, YouTube must 
establish that it has neither actual nor constructive knowledge of the infringements. Constructive 
knowledge turns on whether a reasonable person would objectively know of the infringements. 
The protected works of Plaintiffs and the Class have been infringed by repeat infringers who are 
sheltered by the Content ID system. YouTube has actual knowledge of these repeat infringers but 
fails to administer copyright strikes to them and fails to keep track of their activities under its 
repeat-infringer policy; YouTube therefore should objectively know of these infringements. 
Because YouTube has at least constructive knowledge of infringing material on its site, YouTube 
has failed to satisfy the safe harbor requirements of the DMCA and thus forfeited its safe harbor 
protections. 
92. YouTube must also, in order to qualify for DMCA safe harbor protection, 
establish that it does not financially benefit from infringements that it has the right and ability to 
control. YouTube financially benefits by receiving 45% of all advertising “net income” generated 
by infringing works (and 100% of advertising revenue on its home and search pages when users 
are drawn to those pages in part because of the ready availability of copyright-infringing material), 
whether that advertising is placed by the uploader or the rights holder through the Content ID 
program. In addition, Defendants derive significant value from the data acquired from YouTube 
users, including those users who post and view copyright infringement and those users drawn to 
the site by the ready availability of pirated material. Further, even where YouTube has profited 
from unauthorized uploads until a rights holder discovers it and completes the cumbersome 
takedown process, YouTube keeps all of the revenue it generated during that period of 
infringement, and does not share any portion with the rights holder. 
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93. Moreover, YouTube has the ability to control this content, and has in fact exerted 
such control, by screening every single video uploaded to its site for Content ID-protected 
material prior to publication but not doing so for others even when it has previously received a 
valid takedown notice. YouTube undertakes to control user behavior when such users are directed 
to copyright videos through its suggested video algorithms, search algorithms, and Google’s search 
page, which now influence more than 70% of the content viewed by users. 
94. YouTube must also, in order to qualify for continuing DMCA safe harbor 
protection, establish that it is a passive internet platform, and that it does not undertake to 
substantially influence user behavior. YouTube’s Content ID program, and its partner programs, 
are indeed specifically designed, however, in myriad ways to substantially influence user behavior. 
As just one example, YouTube offers its uploading community tutorials on how users can create 
new metadata to maximize views and revenues. As another example, YouTube imposes upon its 
viewing community personalized viewing curation, Autoplay, and suggested and recommended 
videos, all of which are calculated to influence what its users view, and to increase both the 
viewing community’s use of the YouTube platform, and the resulting advertising revenue. Finally, 
the data Defendants harvest from its users is exploited in myriad ways to influence the behaviors 
and actions of those users through marketing and advertising. All of these programs and functions 
directly and substantially influence its users. Thus, YouTube has violated judicially established 
standards regarding the safe harbor, and as a result, it has forfeited its safe harbor protections. 
95. Because Plaintiffs and the Class have filed takedown notices with YouTube 
regarding their protected works, YouTube is on notice of these infringements and has access to 
copies of the protected works for scanning purposes. Further, because YouTube currently scans 
every uploaded video prior to publication as part of the Content ID program, it has the capacity to 
screen for the protected works of Plaintiff and the Class as well. By refusing to provide pre-
publication screening of previously infringed works belonging to Plaintiff and the Class, YouTube 
has financially benefitted from infringements that is has the right and ability to control, has 
violated the requirements of the DMCA, and has therefore forfeited its safe harbor protections. 
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96. As a further condition of qualification for the DMCA safe harbor, YouTube must 
establish that it accommodates, and does not interfere with, standard technical measures used to 
protect copyrighted works. Pex and similar companies offer services to copyright holders that 
enable them to find infringing works on YouTube and other platforms. Similar to Content ID, 
these companies’ services utilize proprietary media-fingerprinting technology combined with 
access to the online platform’s content via either an API or data scraping techniques. Given the 
long-standing and widespread use of media-fingerprinting technology for the identification of 
infringing material online, such technologies constitute standard technical measures. 
97. Defendants also interfere with standard technical measures designed to protect § 
1202 CMI. Defendants know that the ID3 metadata container is an ISO-approved technical 
measure used primarily to protect copyrighted works and inform listeners of the rights associated 
with the works. However, rather than build a system that ensure this information stays with any 
file that is uploaded by a YouTube user, Defendants have developed systems and processes that 
automatically strip, conceal, and/or alter the information contained in the ID3 or other similar 
metadata containers. 
98. YouTube has failed to accommodate, and has affirmatively interfered with, Pex 
and other companies offering standard technical measures to protect copyrighted works. YouTube 
has denied Pex and other such companies access to its API and has actively interfered with their 
data-scraping of the YouTube platform by blocking or otherwise impeding their access through a 
variety of measures. YouTube further prohibits the use of automated tools to access its platform. 
By interfering with and refusing to accommodate these standard technical measures, YouTube has 
failed to satisfy the safe harbor requirements of the DMCA and forfeited its safe harbor 
protections. 
 CLASS ACTION ALLEGATIONS 
99. Plaintiffs bring this action on behalf of themselves and as a class action pursuant to 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 23(a), and 23(b)(1), 23(b)(2), 23(b)(3), and/or 23(c)(4) on behalf 
of the following proposed classes: 































   
CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT – JURY TRIAL DEMANDED 
 
A. All persons holding the exclusive right to publicly perform, reproduce, publicly 
display, or distribute film, audiovisual, or musical works over the internet for works 
first going into the public domain after December 31, 1977 whose copyrighted works 
have been uploaded to YouTube within the relevant statute of limitations, whether in 
their entirety as part of one single upload or where a portion of the copyrighted work 
has been uploaded to YouTube, where such person has had to submit a successful 
takedown notice with respect to such work, and where such person’s work has 
subsequently been infringed or uploaded without permission and where such person 
has not benefited from the YouTube Content ID program which would have 
automatically and without unilateral action allowed such person to monetize or 
prohibit that upload from being displayed, copied, distributed and performed on the 
YouTube site; and 
B. All persons holding the exclusive right to publicly perform, reproduce, publicly 
display, or distribute film, audiovisual, or musical works over the internet for works 
first published after 1976 and whose works have been uploaded to YouTube without 
the associated copyright management information within the relevant statute of 
limitations. 
100. Excluded from the first class, but not the second class, are United States works not 
registered with the United States Copyright Office and any person who has authorized the 
Defendants to exploit their works; 
101. Excluded from both classes are: (a) Defendants; (b) the subsidiaries and affiliates of 
Defendants; (c) any person or entity who is a partner, officer, director, employee, or controlling 
person of any Defendant; (d) any entity in which Defendant has a controlling interest; (e) any rights 
holder to whom Defendants have directly granted  access to YouTube’s Content ID program for acts 
of infringement occurring after such access began; and (f) the legal representatives, heirs, successors, 
and assigns of any excluded party. 
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102. Numerosity. The members of the Class are so numerous that joinder of all members is 
impracticable. YouTube has more than 2 billion users every month, which according to Defendants is 
“almost one-third of the internet.” Defendants have launched local versions of YouTube in more 
than 100 countries, and users can navigate YouTube in more than 80 languages. Users watch more 
than one billion hours of videos every single day, equating to approximately 5 billion videos viewed 
each day. YouTube estimates that more than 720,000 hours of content are uploaded every day. In 
2007, the New York Times, Credit Suisse, and YouTube employees estimated that 60-70% of content 
uploaded on YouTube was copyrighted material uploaded without the owners’ consent. 
Notwithstanding whether that percentage has dropped significantly in the ensuing timeframe, even a 
5% infringement rate on 5 billion videos a day would result in more than 250 million individual claims 
every day.  
103. Typicality. Plaintiffs’ claims are typical of the claims of the members of the Class. 
Plaintiffs hold exclusive rights to copyrighted works that have been posted on YouTube without 
Plaintiffs’ consent and have been publicly performed, displayed, reproduced, or distributed in 
violation of Plaintiffs’ rights. Plaintiffs’ claims are also typical in that Plaintiffs have issued takedown 
notices, have had their works subsequently uploaded to YouTube, and have not been provided access 
to Content ID. Plaintiffs’ claims are also typical of other Class members in that they require injunctive 
relief to prevent Defendants from continuing to infringe their exclusive rights and in that they reflect 
that Plaintiffs, like Class members, have sustained damages as a result of Defendants’ conduct, 
including, at their election, statutory damages. 
104. Adequacy. Plaintiffs will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the Class and 
have retained counsel competent and experienced in class action litigation and copyright litigation. 
Plaintiffs are committed to the vigorous prosecution of this action and have no interests that are 
adverse or antagonistic to the Class. 
105. Superiority. A class action is superior to all other available means for the fair and 
efficient adjudication of the claims of the members of the Class. The damages suffered by some 
individual members of the Class may be relatively small compared to the burden and expense of 
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individual prosecution of the complex and extensive litigation required to recover from Defendants. It 
would be virtually impossible or impractical for most, if not all, Class members to redress the wrongs 
done to them on an individual basis. Furthermore, individual litigation would be unmanageable for 
the Court system as it would result in hundreds of millions, if not billions, of individual lawsuits 
creating the risk of inconsistent or contradictory judgments and increasing the delay and expense to all 
parties and the court system. In contrast, a class action would present far fewer management 
difficulties. Class action treatment provides the benefits of a single adjudication, economies of scale, 
and supervision by a single court. The members of the Class are reasonably ascertainable through 
methods typical of class action practice and procedure, including through Defendants’ own records. 
106. Existence and Predominance of Common Questions of Law and Fact. Numerous 
questions of law and/or fact are common to Plaintiffs and all members of the Class. These common 
questions derive common answers for all Class members that impact the resolution of the claims on 
grounds equally applicable to all Class members. The common questions of law and fact for the Class 
include, but are not limited to: 
A. Whether Defendants’ conduct as alleged constitutes direct infringement of 
the copyrights held by Plaintiffs and the Class.  
B. Whether Defendants’ conduct as alleged constitutes contributory copyright 
infringement of the copyrights held by Plaintiffs and the Class. 
C. Whether Defendants’ conduct as alleged constitutes inducement of copyright 
infringement of the copyrights held by Plaintiffs and the Class. 
D. Whether Defendants’ conduct as alleged constitutes vicarious infringement 
of the copyrights held by Plaintiffs and the Class. 
E. Whether Defendants acted willfully with respect to the copyright 
infringements alleged. 
F. Whether Defendants have deliberately avoided taking reasonable precautions 
to deter copyright infringement on YouTube. 
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G. Whether Defendants have reasonably implemented a policy and procedure to 
prevent repeat infringement of the copyrights held by Plaintiffs and the Class on 
YouTube. 
H. Whether YouTube was originally designed and/or continues to be 
maintained for the purpose of facilitating the infringement of copyrights held by Plaintiffs 
and the Class. 
I. Whether YouTube has actual or constructive knowledge of the infringements 
of copyrights held by Plaintiffs and the Class. 
J. Whether Defendants have the right and ability to control the infringing 
activities taking place on YouTube. 
K. Whether Defendants derive financial benefits from the infringement of the 
copyrights held by Plaintiffs and the Class on YouTube. 
L. Whether technology exists to identify and remove copyrighted material. 
M. If technology exists to identify and remove infringing materials, whether 
Defendants provide selective access to that technology to increase revenues rather than to 
prevent acts of infringement. 
N. Whether Defendants refuse to make their copyright-monitoring tools 
available to all copyright holders. 
O. Whether Defendants’ refusal to extend the use of Content ID to all copyright 
holders permits Defendants to earn more revenue from infringing material than they 
would have earned had those videos not been uploaded at all or had YouTube immediately 
removed those uploads that would have triggered Content ID. 
P. Whether Defendants’ copyright tools, including Content ID, Content 
Verification Program, and Copyright Match Tool, scan materials before they are uploaded 
and not after, and, if after, whether Defendants are capable of screening the material 
before being uploaded.  
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Q. Whether, upon notification of infringement as set forth in 17 U.S.C. § 
512(c)(3), Defendants acted expeditiously to remove or disable access to the material that 
is claimed to be infringing. 
R. Whether Defendants restrict the number of takedown notifications that 
Plaintiffs and the Class can submit on a daily basis regardless of how many acts of 
infringement occur.  
S. Whether Defendants restrict the number of takedown notifications that 
Defendants will process from Plaintiffs and the Class on a daily basis regardless of how 
many acts of infringement occur.  
T. Whether the defenses set forth in 17 U.S.C. § 512 or elsewhere in the 
Copyright Act are available to Defendants. 
U. Whether YouTube maintains an archive of uploads from within the last three 
years that have been removed by either Defendants or the uploader.  
V. Whether injunctive relief is appropriate. 
W. The amount of statutory damages available for each act of infringement 
based on YouTube’s common practices, procedures, intent, and/or willfulness.  
X. The percentage of revenue earned by YouTube and the infringer for each act 
of infringement to which the copyright holder is entitled. 
Y. Whether Defendants have knowledge of and/or contribute to the removal or 
alteration of copyright management information covered by § 1202. 
Z. Whether Defendants distributed or publicly performed works knowing that 
copyright management information has been removed or altered without the authority of 
the copyright owner. 
AA. Whether Defendants engage in actions and implement policies that 
substantially influence the behavior of YouTube users. 
107. Certification is also appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(1) and/or (b)(2) 
because: 
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A. The prosecution of separate actions by individual Class members would 
create a risk of inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual Class 
members that would establish incompatible standards of conduct for Defendants. 
B. The prosecution of separate actions by individual Class members would 
create a risk of adjudications that would, as a practical matter, be dispositive of the 
interests of other Class members not parties to the adjudications, or substantially impair or 
impede their ability to protect their interests; and 
C. Defendants have acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to 
the Class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief with respect to the entire Class.  
 CAUSE OF ACTION I 
 (Direct Copyright Infringement) 
108. Plaintiffs reincorporate by reference paragraphs 1-107 as if set forth herein. 
109. Plaintiffs are the exclusive copyright owners of the works identified in paragraphs 
16-17. These works as well as millions of other works by Plaintiffs and the Class have been 
reproduced, distributed, displayed, and publicly performed on YouTube without Plaintiffs’ and the 
Class’s authorization.  
110. By engaging in acts causing these infringing works to be reproduced, distributed, 
displayed, and publicly performed on the internet, Defendants are violating Plaintiffs’ and the 
Class’s exclusive rights in violation of 17 U.S.C. § 106, including sections 106(1), 106(3), 106(5), 
106(6), and 17 U.S.C. § 501.  
111.   Defendants’ infringements have been willful, intentional, purposeful, and in 
disregard of and indifferent to the rights of Plaintiffs and the Class. 
112. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants’ infringement of Plaintiffs’ and the 
Class’s exclusive copyrights, Plaintiffs and the Class are entitled to the maximum statutory 
damages pursuant to 17 U.S.C. § 504(c). Alternatively, at the election of Plaintiffs and the Class 
and pursuant to 17 U.S.C. § 504(b), Plaintiffs and the Class shall be entitled to Defendants’ profits 
from the acts of infringement, to be proven at trial. 
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113. Plaintiffs are entitled to their costs, including reasonable attorneys’ fees, pursuant 
to 17 U.S.C. § 505. 
114. Defendants’ conduct is causing and, unless enjoined by this Court, will continue to 
cause Plaintiffs and the Class great and irreparable injury that cannot fully be compensated. 
Pursuant to 17 U.S.C. § 502, Plaintiffs and the Class are entitled to a permanent injunction 
requiring Defendants to employ reasonable methodologies to prevent or limit infringement of 
Plaintiffs’ and the Class’s copyrights. 
CAUSE OF ACTION II 
(Inducement of Copyright Infringement) 
115. Plaintiffs reincorporate by reference paragraphs 1-114 as if set forth herein. 
116. YouTube users have infringed and are infringing Plaintiffs’ and the Class’s rights in 
their registered copyrighted musical and audiovisual works by, inter alia, uploading and 
downloading infringing copies of Plaintiffs’ and the Class’s copyrighted works onto and from 
YouTube’s website and publicly performing, displaying, distributing, and reproducing, or 
purporting to authorize the public performance, display, distribution, or reproduction of such 
copyrighted works or infringing videos, all without authorization. YouTube users are therefore 
directly infringing Plaintiffs’ and the Class’s exclusive rights of reproduction, distribution, public 
performance, and public display under U.S.C. §§ 106(1), (3), (4), and (5). 
117. Defendants are liable under the Copyright Act for inducing the infringing acts of 
YouTube users. Defendants exercise control of and/or influence which videos their users view 
and which infringing material gets removed or does not get removed. Defendants operate 
YouTube with the objective of promoting its use to infringe Plaintiffs’ and the Class’s copyrights 
and are unlawfully fostering copyright infringement by YouTube users.  
118. Defendants are fully aware, or at least should be aware, that Plaintiffs’ and the 
Class’s audiovisual and musical works are copyrighted and authorized for purchase through 
various outlets, including numerous lawfully authorized online digital download services. 
Defendants are equally aware, or at least should be aware, that YouTube users are employing 
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YouTube to unlawfully reproduce, distribute, publicly perform, and publicly display Plaintiffs’ and 
the Class’s copyrighted works. Defendants intend for, encourage, and induce YouTube users to 
employ YouTube in this regard. 
119. Defendants’ infringements have been willful, intentional, purposeful, and in 
disregard of and indifferent to the rights of Plaintiffs and the Class. 
120. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants’ infringement of Plaintiffs’ and the 
Class’s exclusive copyrights, Plaintiffs and the Class are entitled to the maximum statutory 
damages pursuant to 17 U.S.C. § 504(c). Alternatively, at the election of Plaintiffs and the Class 
and pursuant to 17 U.S.C. § 504(b), Plaintiffs and the Class shall be entitled to Defendants’ profits 
from the acts of infringement, to be proven at trial. 
121. Plaintiffs are entitled to their costs, including reasonable attorneys’ fees, pursuant 
to 17 U.S.C. § 505. 
122. Defendants’ conduct is causing and, unless enjoined by this Court, will continue to 
cause Plaintiffs and the Class great and irreparable injury that cannot fully be compensated. 
Pursuant to 17 U.S.C. § 502, Plaintiffs and the Class are entitled to a permanent injunction 
requiring Defendants to employ reasonable methodologies to prevent or limit infringement of 
Plaintiffs’ and the Class’s copyrights. 
CAUSE OF ACTION III 
(Contributory Copyright Infringement) 
123. Plaintiffs reincorporate by reference paragraphs 1-122 as if set forth herein. 
124. YouTube users have infringed and are infringing Plaintiffs’ and the Class’s rights in 
their registered copyrighted musical and audiovisual works by, inter alia, uploading and 
downloading infringing copies of Plaintiffs’ and the Class’s copyrighted works onto and from 
YouTube’s website and publicly performing, displaying, distributing, and reproducing, or 
purporting to authorize the public performance, display, distribution, or reproduction of such 
copyrighted works or infringing videos, all without authorization. YouTube users are therefore 
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directly infringing Plaintiffs’ and the Class’s exclusive rights of reproduction, distribution, public 
performance, and public display under U.S.C. §§ 106(1), (3), (4), and (5). 
125. Defendants are liable as contributory copyright infringers for the infringing acts of 
YouTube users. Defendants enable, induce, facilitate, and materially contribute to each act of 
infringement by YouTube users.  
126. Defendants have actual and constructive knowledge that YouTube users are 
employing YouTube to copy, distribute, publicly perform, and publicly display Plaintiffs’ and the 
Class’s copyrighted works. Acting with actual and constructive knowledge, Defendants enable, 
facilitate, and materially contribute to YouTube users’ copyright infringement, which could not 
occur without Defendants’ enablement. 
127. Defendants’ infringements have been willful, intentional, purposeful, and in 
disregard of and indifferent to the rights of Plaintiffs and the Class. 
128. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants’ infringement of Plaintiffs’ and the 
Class’s exclusive copyrights, Plaintiffs and the Class are entitled to the maximum statutory 
damages pursuant to 17 U.S.C. § 504(c). Alternatively, at the election of Plaintiffs and the Class 
and pursuant to 17 U.S.C. § 504(b), Plaintiffs and the Class shall be entitled to Defendants’ profits 
from the acts of infringement, to be proven at trial. 
129. Plaintiffs are entitled to their costs, including reasonable attorneys’ fees, pursuant 
to 17 U.S.C. § 505. 
130. Defendants’ conduct is causing and, unless enjoined by this Court, will continue to 
cause Plaintiffs and the Class great and irreparable injury that cannot fully be compensated. 
Pursuant to 17 U.S.C. § 502, Plaintiffs and the Class are entitled to a permanent injunction 
requiring Defendants to employ reasonable methodologies to prevent or limit infringement of 
Plaintiffs’ and the Class’s copyrights. 
 CAUSE OF ACTION IV 
 (Vicarious Copyright Infringement) 
131. Plaintiffs reincorporate by reference paragraphs 1-130 as if set forth herein. 
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132. YouTube users have infringed and are infringing Plaintiffs’ and the Class’s rights in 
their registered copyrighted musical and audiovisual works by, inter alia, uploading and 
downloading infringing copies of Plaintiffs’ and the Class’s copyrighted works onto and from 
YouTube’s website and publicly performing, displaying, distributing, and reproducing, or 
purporting to authorize the public performance, display, distribution, or reproduction of such 
copyrighted works or infringing videos, all without authorization. YouTube users are therefore 
directly infringing Plaintiffs’ and the Class’s exclusive rights of reproduction, distribution, public 
performance, and public display under U.S.C. §§ 106(1), (3), (4), and (5). 
133. Defendants are vicariously liable for the infringing acts of YouTube users. 
Defendants have both the right and the ability to supervise YouTube users’ infringing conduct and 
to prevent YouTube users from infringing Plaintiffs’ and the Class’s copyrighted works.  
134. YouTube significantly and directly benefits from widespread infringement by its 
users. The availability of a vast collection of infringing copyrighted works on YouTube acts as a 
substantial draw, attracting users to the website and increasing the amount of time they spend 
there when they visit. Defendants derive substantial advertising revenue tied directly to the volume 
of traffic they are able to attract to YouTube. 
135. Defendants’ infringements have been willful, intentional, purposeful, and in 
disregard of an indifferent to the rights of Plaintiffs and the Class. 
136. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants’ infringement of Plaintiffs’ and the 
Class’s exclusive copyrights, Plaintiffs and the Class are entitled to the maximum statutory 
damages pursuant to 17 U.S.C. § 504(c). Alternatively, at the election of Plaintiffs and the Class 
and pursuant to 17 U.S.C. § 504(b), Plaintiffs and the Class shall be entitled to Defendants’ profits 
from the acts of infringement, to be proven at trial. 
137. Plaintiffs are entitled to their costs, including reasonable attorneys’ fees, pursuant 
to 17 U.S.C. § 505. 
138. Defendants’ conduct is causing and, unless enjoined by this Court, will continue to 
cause Plaintiffs and the Class great and irreparable injury that cannot fully be compensated. 
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Pursuant to 17 U.S.C. § 502, Plaintiffs and the Class are entitled to a permanent injunction 
requiring Defendants to employ reasonable methodologies to prevent or limit infringement of 
Plaintiffs’ and the Class’s copyrights. 
 CAUSE OF ACTION V 
(Removal of Copyright Management Information and Distribution of Altered or Missing 
Copyright Management Information) 
139. Plaintiffs reincorporate by reference paragraphs 1-138 as if set forth herein. 
140. Each copy of Plaintiffs’ and the Class’s musical and audiovisual works that has 
been lawfully distributed contains copyright management information on the work, included in the 
metadata of the digital file of the work, and/or on the packaging of the work. This copyright 
management information includes, inter alia, the identification of Plaintiffs and the Class as the 
creators of the works and/or as the copyright owners of the works, the producer, performers on 
the album, engineers, recording dates, and more. This copyright management information is 
conveyed in connection with each musical and audiovisual work and is protected under 17 
U.S.C.A. § 1202(b). 
141. On information and belief, in the process of uploading the digital file of Plaintiffs’ 
and the Class’s musical or audiovisual work for unlawful and unauthorized copying, display, and 
distribution on YouTube, Defendants intentionally and knowingly removed, or caused to be 
removed, Plaintiffs’ and the Class’s copyright management information from the digital file of 
Plaintiffs’ and the Class’s works. 
142. Defendants thereafter displayed and distributed unauthorized and infringing copies 
of Plaintiffs’ and the Class’s works with the intent and knowledge that copyright management 
information had been intentionally removed therefrom. 
143. Defendants intentionally removed Plaintiffs’ and the Class’s copyright management 
information, added additional metadata to be exploited by their own systems, and displayed and 
distributed the infringing work in those systems with the knowledge that doing so would induce, 
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enable, facilitate, or conceal the ongoing and additional infringement of Plaintiffs’ and the Class’s 
rights under the Copyright Act. 
144. Plaintiffs and the Class have previously filed takedown notices with YouTube, 
providing Defendants with knowledge that Plaintiffs’ and the Class’s works contain copyright 
management information identifying Plaintiffs and the Class as the creators of the works and/or 
as the copyright owners of the works.  
145. Defendants thereafter displayed and distributed unauthorized and infringing copies 
of Plaintiffs’ and the Class’s works with the intent and knowledge that copyright management 
information had been removed therefrom without the permission of Plaintiffs and the Class, the 
copyright owners. 
146. Defendants intentionally displayed and distributed the copies of Plaintiffs’ and the 
Class’s works that were missing copyright management information, to which they added 
additional metadata to be exploited by their own systems, with the knowledge that doing so would 
induce, enable, facilitate, or conceal the ongoing and additional infringement on its systems of 
Plaintiffs’ and the Class’s rights under the Copyright Act. 
147. Defendants engaged in these activities without the consent or authorization of 
Plaintiffs and the Class. 
148. Plaintiffs and the Class have been injured as a result of these violations of 17 
U.S.C.A. § 1202(b) and are entitled to injunctive relief, removal and takedown of the infringing 
works, damages, costs, and attorneys’ fees. Pursuant to 17 U.S.C.A. § 1203(c)(3), Plaintiffs and the 
Class are entitled to the maximum statutory damages for each violation of 17 U.S.C.A. § 1202(b). 
 PRAYER FOR RELIEF 
 Wherefore, Plaintiffs, on behalf of themselves and the Class, pray for judgment against 
Defendants as follows: 
149. Determining that this action may be maintained as a class action pursuant to 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 and directing that reasonable notice of this action be provided 
to the Class pursuant to Rule 23(c)(2). 
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150. Granting Plaintiffs and the Class injunctive and other equitable relief enjoining 
Defendants, their officers, agents, servants, and employees, and all those acting in concert with the 
aforementioned parties: 
A. From directly or indirectly reproducing, publicly performing, publicly 
displaying, or distributing the copyrighted works to which Plaintiffs and the Class have 
exclusive rights. 
B. From causing, contributing to, inducing, enabling, facilitating, or 
participating in the infringement of any of the works referred to in Paragraph A, above. 
C. To affirmatively adopt, implement, and offer to all persons the 
technological measures available now, including Content ID, and those that shall become 
available in the future to identify and protect copyrighted content uploaded without 
consent and prevent it from being posted or otherwise made available through the 
facilities owned, operated, or controlled by Defendants. 
151. Awarding Plaintiffs’ and the Class’s damages and Defendants’ profits derived from 
the infringing acts, and/or statutory damages, in the amount permitted by law with respect to each 
work infringed, including statutory damages for willful misconduct. 
152. Disgorging Defendants of all profits, direct or indirect, illegally obtained as a result 
of the conduct alleged herein. 
153. Finding Defendants jointly and severally liable for all monetary damages awarded. 
154. Awarding prejudgment interest to the maximum extent permitted by law. 
155. Awarding Plaintiffs’ attorneys’ fees, costs, and expenses in this action. 
156. Awarding such other and further relief as the Court may deem just and proper. 
 DEMAND FOR A JURY TRIAL 
157. In accordance with Fed. R. Civ. P. 38, Plaintiffs hereby demand a trial by jury on 
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Dated: July 2, 2020  Respectfully submitted,  
 /s/ Steven M. Berezney  
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205 North Michigan, Suite 1950 
Chicago, IL  60601 
Telephone: (312) 641-9750 
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Stephen M. Tillery (pro hac vice forthcoming) 
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KOREIN TILLERY, LLC 
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